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THE POWER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION TO INITIATE
EQUALIZED RATE STRuC'URS-s-The recent decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Texas and Pac. Ry. z. United States I brings to light a problem
of rate regulation that is of practical and far-reaching importance to a great num-
ber of industries and localities. The problem essentially involves the propriety of
the exercise by the Interstate Commerce Commission of its power to initiate rate
structures when used for the express purpose of encouraging or protecting one
of two localities, both competing for the same market. Admittedly the exercise
of this power has had but little legal sanction in the past, principally for the reason
that it was said to involve a regulation of "industrial conditions under the guise
of regulating rates". 2 Although it would seem that the present status of indus-
trial and economic conditions is principally the result of such laissez-faire doc-
trines, the Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed these tenets by its decision in the
Texas and Pac. Ry. case. The effect of the decision was distinctly to curtail
the Commission's power to regulate rate discrimination between ports. The
facts of the case were that Galveston and New Orleans were both competitors
for the hinterland trade. The carrier serving both ports neutralized the geo-
graphic advantage of Galveston by making the rates from the interior equal to
each city. Several orders 3 by the Commission which re-established the natural
advantage of Galveston were finally 4 enjoined by the Supreme Court. As a
result, both ports were left subject to the varying policy of the railroad serving
them. The reasons for the Court's injunction were twofold. First, that a
port is not a "locality" within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act since
it is neither a point of origin nor destination, and the Commission therefore has
no power to regulate discrimination between such "localities". Second, even
if it be considered a "locality", the "discriminatory" practice could not be elim-
inated by action of the offending carrier alone, for it served Texas ports jointly
with an innocent carrier. The dissent 5 was considerably less artificial in its
reasoning. Discrimination between ports, said Mr. Justice Stone, "was precisely
the kind [of practice] which the Act 6 was intended to prohibit and the Com-
mission empowered to prevent"; 7 and further, the discrimination could be effec-
tively terminated by ordering the offending carrier to raise its rates to New
Orleans." Without attacking the merits of the final result,9 the case serves to
2289 U. S. 627, 53 Sup. Ct. 768 (1933).
'Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462, 472 (S. D. W. Va. 1928) ; see also
Chicago R. 1. & P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 71 Fed. 68o (C. C. N. D. Ill.
199o).
' alveston Commercial Ass'n v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. R., io I. C. C. iio (1925),
128 I. C. C. 349 (1927), x6o I. C. C. 345 (1929).
' In the lower Federal court, the Commission's action was sustained. Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 281 (S. D. Tex. 193o).
'Written by Stone, J., and concurred in by Hughes, C. J., Brandeis and Cardozo, 33.6 24 STAT. 380 §3 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (I) (1929).
'Supra note i, at 659, 53 Sup. Ct. at 780. This conclusion was reached on a considera-
tion of the unambiguous nature of the Act and the persuasive weight to be attached to the
administrative construction of the statute.
8 The factual situation confronting the Court was as follows: The Texas & Pac. Ry.
served New Orleans on its own line, but served Galveston jointly with an innocent carrier.
Assuming the existence of discrimination between the two points to the prejudice of Gal-
veston, this could be removed by adopting one of two alternatives-raising the rates to New
Orleans, or lowering them to Galveston. The first alternative is sanctioned by the Trans-
portation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 484 (920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (I) (929). Under the
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illustrate several points worthy of consideration. First, cases involving this
type of problem undoubtedly have a considerable and perhaps deleterious effect
on large groups of persons.' Second, the Court seems averse to discuss the
problem as one between competing localities, but chooses rather to deal with it
as an issue between the shipper and the carrier." Finally, the case serves to
focus attention upon the desirability of granting power to the Commission to
create rate structures for the purpose of regulating trade between competing
localities.
In view of the importance of the problem raised by this case, one would
expect legislation on the subject to be profuse or at least decisive; interestingly
enough, however, the opposite is actually the case. No express power to use
rates for the purpose of regulating trade between competing localities is given
under the Interstate Commerce Act. The only relevant portion of the Act is
section 3 (1) 12 which makes it unlawful for any carrier to create any undue
preference or prejudice to a particular locality. Although nothing in the Act
would expressly forbid reading this power into the section, for reasons strongly
grounded in individualistic concepts this was never done. That this defect in
legislative intent may have annoyed Congress subsequently is not certain, but
it may have been to some small degree instrumental in the enactment of the
Hoch-Smith Resolution of 1925. 13 Moved by the more immediate desire to aid
the considerably depressed agricultural industry,14 Congress passed the resolu-
tion and enacted that a true policy of rate making should take into consideration
the particular conditions which prevail in a given industry (and by hypoth-
esis, a locality) insofar as it is legally possible to do so. Although there was
no clear articulation of an intent by Congress to change the existing principles
of rate structure,'5 nevertheless it would seem that if any effect were to be given
original Act of 1887 there was no rate-making power whatsoever. Cincinnati,. N. 0. & Tex.
Pac. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 196, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 705 (1896) ;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U. S. 479, 17
Sup. Ct. 896 (1897). This defect was partially remedied by the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 589
§ 4 (I906), in that the Commission was given power to establish maximum rates. The Act
of 192o amended the Hepburn Act by empowering the Commission to create maximum and/or
minimum rates. The second, alternative, lowering the rates to Galveston, could be effected
by prescribing a percentage reduction in the joint rates agreed upon by the Texas & Pac.
Ry. and the innocent carrier. This procedure is sanctioned under the Act of 1920, 41 STAT.
486 § 6 (920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (6) (1929).
' The principal cause of contention is not with the actual result of the case in regard to
the equalization or non-equalization of rates between the particular localities involved, but
rather with the question of who shall exercise this power of regulation. The majority opin-
ion of the Court took the view that the carrier is the proper body.
"Although the Court rarely discusses the problem from this viewpoint, the latter has
been recognized as of considerable importance. See, for example, the manner in which it
was dealt with by the Court in Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 487, 34 Sup. Ct. 986,
991 (1914).
' In Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249, 50 Sup. Ct. 315 (I93O), the Court
affirmed an order by the Commission which deprived the complainant shipper of a competitive
advantage, on the ground that he had no standing in court, since the question was entirely
one between the shipper "discriminated" against and the carrier serving him.
124 STAT. 380 § 3 (887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (1) (929).
"43 STAT. 801 (925), 49 U. S. C. A. §55 (1929).
"The third paragraph of the resolution sets forth: "In view of the existing depression
in agriculture, the Commission is hereby directed . ...
'WAGNER, THE Hocn-SafITH RESOLUTION (1929) c. 16; Robinson, The Hoch-Smith
Resolution and the Future of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv.
61o, 61g.
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this law-making 1 enactment, such an intent must be inferred.17  In spite of this
obvious conclusion the effect of the Supreme Court's interpretation was to strip
the resolution of its virility and to consider it "more in the nature of a hopeful
characterization of an object deemed desirable if, and insofar as, it may be
attainable, than as a rule intended to control rate making".,' It can therefore
be said that no effective legislative guide exists for a true solution of the problem,
and resort must be had to case treatment of the subject in order to comprehend
the trend of sentiment.
Before attempting to analyze the cases leading up to what may be deemed
the present undesirable status of the problem, it is relevant to call attention to
one basic defect in the legalistic approach used by the court in dealing with this
problem. The Supreme Court is wont to deal with the issue in rate cases as a
legal problem solely affecting a shipper and a carrier. To a layman the presence
of the carrier in the problem is merely incidental, since the essential conflict is
between two localities, each vying with the other for an advantage in a common
market. The shipper, with this view in mind, feels that the interest of the
carrier is limited to a "fair return on the fair value" of the property invested in
transportation facilities, and once this requisite is satisfied the interest of the
shipper vanishes. The essential nature of the difference in these concepts, one
legal and the other economic and practical, can be more clearly appreciated if
the words of a witness called to testify before the Commission are kept in mind:
"Upon cross examination he was asked: 'This case then is really a
commercial fight by your district against West Virginia and Kentucky, and
is not a rate case, is it?' He replied: 'Any rate case I ever heard of was
a commercial fight, and this is like the rest of them.' "'s
This viewpoint not only presents a more realistic picture of the ultimate issues,
but makes possible a more direct approach to a sane and moderate solution of
the problem.
In the exposition of the cases to follow, certain objectives are intended to
predominate in the analysis. A primary aim will be to establish a rationale for
apparent inconsistencies between the Court's words in one case, and its action
in another. A secondary goal, perhaps just as important, will be the investigation
of only those decisions which in effect sanction the exercise of this extraordinary
power by the Commission, and which escaped the vigilance of the Court simply
because no attention was drawn to the fact that the Commission had acted ultra
vires. The final objective will attempt to set forth what changes if any have
occurred in the viewpoint of the Court.
In one of the earliest cases in which the question was presented, -0 the
Supreme Court denied that there was any legal concern in the relationship be-
tween rates and the economic fortunes of localities. Here a shipper and his
carrier had entered into a contract for rebate, presumably for the purpose of
aiding the shipper. The Court in denying the validity of the contract, held that
' To the effect that the resolution is to have all the force and effect of law and is not
merely recommendatory, see WAGNER, op. cit. supra note 15, c. 5.
'To give no effect to the resolution, as was done by the Court in Ann Arbor R. R. v.
United States, 281 U. S. 658, 5o Sup. Ct. 444 (193o) and Anchor' Coal Co. v. United States,
supra note 2, would make the resolution an empty gesture on the part of Congress. That
this was not the Commission's interpretation see Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C.
309, 362 (1927).
'a Ann Arbor R. R. v. United States, supra note 17, at 668, 5o Sup. Ct. at 446. See also
Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, supra note 2, at 474.
'Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 101 I. C. C. 513, at 541 (1925).
' Union Pac. Ry. v. Goodridge, 149 U. S. 680, 13 Sup. Ct. 970 (89).
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it resulted in a discrimination among shippers. In speaking of a statute -
similar in essential respects to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Court said:
"The statute recognizes the fact that it is no proper business of a
common carrier to foster particular enterprises or to build up new indus-
tries . . . it is bound to deal fairly with the public, to extend them reason-
able facilities for the transportation of their persons and property, and
to put all its patrons upon an absolute equality. . . . The right of a railroad
to charge a certain sum for freight does not depend at all upon the fact
whether its customers are making or losing by their business." 22
The dogmatic attitude expressed in this quotation was due in large part no doubt
to the widespread fear that railroads, by the unregulated exercise of partiality,
could wreck the fortunes of less favored localities. If this holding, then, be
considered as precluding "discrimination" between competitive localities or ship-
pers, a relevant question would be the extent of its application. Such an inquiry
shows that the Court, immediately realizing the inadequacy of a strict interpre-
tation of this rule, found it necessary to modify its attitude in several instances.
Thus, in a case 23 involving the relationship between rates on foreign merchan-
dise transported within the country and rates on domestic goods, the Court held it
perfectly proper for import trade to be favored at the expense of domestic com-
petition. The basis of the decision, undoubtedly, was a desire to foster "healthy"
competition between foreign and domestic localities, to the immediate advantage
of both the carrier and the general public.-4 No issue was made as to the
desirability of such a practice which, in effect, discriminated in favor of foreign
localities. The Commission was even reproved for having dealt with the
problem solely from the viewpoint of competing localities. The Act, it was held,
did not forbid the consideration of "circumstances and conditions" attendant
upon foreign traffic as an element in justifying existing discrimination. The case
on the whole seems to represent an abortive and clearly unsuccessful attempt
to justify "discriminatory" rates made expressly for the purpose of fostering
foreign trade. This, it should be remembered, was three years after the Court
had said that "it is no proper business of a carrier to foster particular enterprises
or build up new industries".
25
In another situation, discrimination between competing localities is not only
recognized but in a certain sense encouraged. The right of a carrier to meet the
competition of cheaper forms of transportation has been for many years a proper
defense to what would otherwise constitute discrimination. 6 This is the usual
basis for the long and short haul exception to the prohibition of discriminatory
rate structures.27  Factually, the result of this exception to the general rule is
that point A, competing in a common market with point B, may enjoy lower rates
even though farther from the market than point B, in order that the carrier
serving both points may meet rail or water competition at point A. Obviously
the exercise of this privilege by the railroads may result in placing one shipper
Colo. Laws 1885, at 307 et seq.
Union Pac. Ry. v. Goodridge, supra note 2o, at 69o, 695, 13 Sup. Ct. at 974, 976.
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666
(1896).
21Id. at 218, 16 Sup. Ct. at 675.
Union Pac. Ry. v. Goodridge, supra note 20, at 69o, 13 Sup. Ct. at 974.
BEALE AND WYMAN, RAILROAD REGULATION (2d ed. 1915) § 792 et seq.
'This was recognized both before and after the long and short haul clause was incor-
porated into the Act of 1887, 24 STAT. 38o §4 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §4 (I) (1929). See
BEATm AND WYMAN, op. cit. sapra note 26, § 780 et seq.
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or locality at an advantage over its competitor. Recognizing the danger of the
uncontrolled exploitation of this power, the Mann-Elkins Act of 191o 28 withdrew
from the carrier the right to exercise primary judgment in the matter and lodged
it with the Commission.
Thus the earlier cases illustrate at least two situations where the creation
of rate structures may result in encouraging or protecting one of two competing
localities. In one case, the rates were expressly ordered to be made on that
basis and for that purpose. In the other, the effect of the rates was said to be
incidental to the right of the railroad to meet competition. That this incidental
result may be just as certain and effective as if the power had been affirmatively
exercised was not considered a valid objection to the constitutionality of the
Mann-Elkins Act. In the Intermountain Rate Cases,29 the Court refused to
recognize that the Act had now clothed the Commission with a "wide and unde-
fined discretion by virtue of which it became its duty to see to it that communi-
ties and individuals obtained fair opportunities, that discord was allayed and
commercial justice everywhere given full play"' °
A more direct approach to the problem was manifested in later decisions.
The general ground of reversal, whenever the Court's attention was directed to
it, was that the Commission had undertaken to do that which it had no power
to do-namely to regulate trade by the use of rate structures. From an exami-
nation of the two earliest cases the stand of the Court appears inconsistent. 31
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.,3 2 the Court
permitted the Commission to reduce that portion of the through rate from the
Atlantic seaboard which was in use between the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.
The obvious effect of this order was to encourage eastern shipments in competi-
tion with, and to the detriment of, Central Mississippi shippers.33 In the Willa-
nette Valley case,'" decided less than a year later, an order which enabled the
Willamette Valley to retain its advantage in outgoing freight rates over the
Portland interests, a competing locality, was enjoined by the Supreme Court
because the order, in the opinion of the Court, had been made expressly for that
purpose. Despite the contention of the Commission that it had not attempted
to regulate trade, the effect of the order was as if it had. Objectively there can
be no reconciliation between the cases, for the effect of the order in each was
to aid or protect one of two competing localities. Yet in one case it was deemed
proper and in the other improper.
That there was nothing wrongful per se in the order of the Commission in
the Willamette Valley case is shown by the fact that in a subsequent adjudication
n36 STAT. 547 §8 (I910), 49 U. S. C. A. §4 (I) (1929).
Supra note io.
o Id. at 487, 34 Sup. Ct. at 992.22Among the grounds for reviewing the Commission's rulings are errors in "questions
of law". "Questions of fact" will only be reviewed insofar as necessary to establish mis-
takes in law. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup.
Ct. ioS (1912). It is always doubtful how far the Court will go in any particular case. In
the two cases discussed in the text, the Court reviewed the facts of the Willamette Valley case,
infra note 34, and refused to do so in the Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. case, infra note 32, yet the
"question of law" in both cases was approximately the same. DIcKINSON, ADMINISm RAvTE
JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW (1927) 69. The rationale for this inconsistency
may rest on whether the Court agrees or disagrees with the result reached by the Commis-
sion. Cavers, "Questions of Law" in Lake Cargo Coal Rate Regulatiol (1931) 37 W. VA.
L. Q. 391, 420.
8218 U. S. 88, 30 Sup. Ct. 651 (igio).
Cognizant of this fact, the Court ignored its implications and concluded that the Com-
mission had determined "nothing but that the through rates on Atlantic seaboard shipments
to the Missouri River cities are too high." Id. at 110, 30 Sup. Ct. at 65g.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 Sup. Ct. 288
(I9"1).
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of the same issue, substantially the same rates were ordered into effect.3 5 This
time, however, the order was sustained,30 principally because the Court was con-
vinced that the Commission had not made the order for an ultra vires purpose.
3 7
This anomaly-a contradiction between the words of the Court and the objective
effect of the rate orders-seems to have been the antecedent of the Lemon
Cases."' There again the order of the Commission was enjoined becaise the
Commission had used "improper" reasons, but a subsequent order effecting the
same result was sustained because no mention was made of the purpose of the
order. The inference becomes irresistible that if the Commission must resort
to the use of invocatory words to obtain judicial sanction, then certainly much of
the value of judicial review is lost.
In two succeeding cases, the Supreme Court took a more positive stand
and sanctioned the issuance of orders which undoubtedly had the effect of aiding
the less fortunately situated competitor. Interestingly enough, in neither of the
cases was the attention of the Court directed to the natural result of the decisions,
and it seems doubtful whether the outcome would have been the same had this
been done.
In United States v. New River Co.,3" the Court refused to place "joint"
mines-those served by more than one carrier-in a better position with respect
to the distribution of cars than "local" mines-those served by only one carrier.
That the effect of this decision was to deprive "joint" mines of a geographic
advantage over their competitors was within the purview of the Court, but it was
not considered controlling.4 ° In the other case, Virginian Ry. v. United States,1
the Commission's order 4_ forced the objecting carrier to treat fifty-four mines,
unfavorably located, on the same basis as forty-five mines located more advan-
tageously. Because of the latter's position and the carrier's desire to obtain more
business, a trackage agreement had been entered into, which enabled the forty-
five mines to reduce their transportation costs. The Supreme Court's affirmance.
of the order resulted in the extension of the advantage enjoyed by the forty-five
mines to the less fortunate fifty-four mines.
Both of these cases may be reconciled to some extent with former expres-
sions of opinion in that here the subject matter involved the development of
natural resources. A principle of rate making which seeks to insure an economic
and gradual development of natural resources 4 should not be lightly set aside
because it results incidentally in a regulation of trade. If this were the motivat-
ing force behind the decisions, and if it had been more openly expressed, then
Oregon & Washington Lumber Mf'rs' Ass'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 21 I. C. C. 389
(I9II).
Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 197 Fed. 167 (Com. Ct. 1912).
Id. at 171.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 19o Fed. 591 (Coin. Ct.
1911) enjoined the order granted in Arlington Heights Fruit Exch. v. Southern Pac. Co., 19
I. C. C. 148 (1910). The subsequent order, creating identical rates, Arlington Heights Fruit
Exch. v. Southern Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C. 149 (I911), was affirmed in Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. United States, 203 Fed. 56 (Con. Ct. 1913).
39265 U. S. 533, 44 Sup. Ct. 6io (924). For comment and discussion of the problem
in this case see Note (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 753.
"' The short and caustic dissent by Mr. Justice McKenna was considerably more con-
cerned by this deprivation of a property right. United States v. New River Co., supra note
39, at 543, 44 Sup. Ct. at 613.
4272 U. S. 658, 47 Sup. Ct. 222 (1926). It is relevant to note that nowhere in the opin-
ion was the power of the Commission to act as it did attacked on the grounds of being ultra
,'zres.
. Wyoming Coal Co. v. Virginian Ry., 96 I. C. C. 359 (1925), 98 I. C. C. 488 (1925).
'Commissioner Potter, dissenting, in Assigned Cars for Bituminous Coal Mines, 8o I.
C. C. 520, at 580 (1923), points out the rationale for this principle.
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perhaps the unfortunate results of the later Ann Arbor 4 4 and Lake Cargo Coal
Cases4 might have been averted.
The Commission was considerably encouraged by its surreptitious success
in the two mines cases and the new guide in rate making as set forth in the
Hoch-Sinith Resolution. As a result, in the Ann Arbor Case, it ordered into
effect "the lowest possible lawful rates compatible with the maintenance of ade-
quate transportation service". 4" The low rates, which allegedly did not interfere
with a fair return on the fair value of the railroad property,47 were necessary
to alleviate the considerably depressed conditions of the California fruit industry.
As previously indicated, the Supreme Court rejected the Commission's interpre-
tation and held that the resolution added nothing new to rate principles.4" In
the Lake Cargo Coal Cases, which never reached the Supreme Court, a similar
result was obtained. In this case the economic problem was more acute and
obvious. The Pennsylvania coal fields had for many years been putting up a losing
battle with the non-unionized fields of Kentucky and West Virginia. By 1927
a substantial differential in favor of rates from the Pennsylvania coal fields to
the Great Lakes market had been effected.4  In that year, the Commission, influ-
enced by what it thought was the obvious purpose of the resolution and the then
existent depression in the Pennsylvania fields, increased the differential. The
District Court of West Virginia, upon complaint by the Kentucky fields, enjoined
the increase on the usual ground--"the Commission does not have the right . . .
to regulate industrial conditions under the guise of regulating rates".5 1 The
effect of these decisions was not only to render nugatory any possible intent of
Congress in passing the resolution, and to retrogress to the Willalnette Valley
case, but also, by inference, to wipe out the salutary effects of the New River
and Virginian Ry. cases.
In the Texas & Pac. Ry. case,5 2 the most recent one on the subject, the
Court again came to the conclusion that the Commission was attempting to aid
one locality over its competitor. This time, however, the opinion for the most
part avoided the discussion of the extra-jurisdictional exercise of power and
confined itself to the artificial distinction between a port and a locality. This may
be significant. It may mean that the Court is not completely averse to a reason-
able exercise of the power to regulate trade, but that in this instance the Court
feared that the Commission's order was the abnormal and undesired product of
"log-rolling". If this interpretation be correct (although nothing in the opinion
itself warrants it) then the problem has come considerably nearer its solution."
"Supra note 17.
Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, supra note 2.
*0 California Growers', etc., League v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 I. C. C. 25, at 57 (1927).
a California Growers' etc., League v. Southern Pac. Co., 132 I. C. C. 582 (1927).
"The Commission thought that the resolution sanctioned the reduction of otherwise
reasonable rates, if the conditions of the shipper warranted it. The Court took the view that
if this were the true purpose of the Resolution, its constitutionality would be open to serious
question. Ann Arbor R. R. v. United States, supra note 17. On the question of the constitu-
tionality of this type of legislation in general see Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 236
U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429 (1915) ; Norfolk & Western Ry. v. West Virginia, 236 U. S. 6o5,
35 Sup. Ct. 437 (1915).
"In 1925 a differential of twenty-five cents per ton was found to be reasonable. Lake
Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, supra note ig.
I' The differential was increased to approximately forty-five cents per ton. Lake Cargo
Coal Rates, 1925, supra note 17, at 360. In the succeeding year an application for a reduc-
tion in the differential was refused. Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928).
a Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, supra note 2, at 472.
' Siepra note i.
t3 The more probable explanation of the decision is that the Commission, in the opinion
of the Court, is not the proper body to initiate equalized rate structures between competing
localities. The right of the carrier to do so has often been affirmed. Dutton Lumber Corp.
v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 151 I. C. C. 391 (1929).
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This series of decisions presents the status of the problem today. The result
is both confusing and undesirable. Confusion lies in the fact that there is no
acceptable reconciliation between the flat denials of the Supreme Court '4 and
the continued attempts by the Commission to exercise this power. Indeed, it is
difficult to reconcile, from the standpoint of ultimate effect, the very decisions of
the Court. Although some of the attempts have in effect been successful (pri-
marily due to the failure of the appellants to make an issue of the question of
power), 5 the statements of the Court, unwavering in their denial of the right
to exercise this power, challenge their effectiveness.
The undesirable feature of the present situation is that it runs contrary to
economic trends. Should the power to aid and regulate industries by the use of
rate structures be conceded to the Commission, one of the favorable phases of
such regulation would be a more equitable division of markets and trade zones.
Although, because of practical considerations, such an arrangement may not
appear feasible when applied to localities engaged solely in trade and commerce,"
it does seem, however, more practicable in regard to localities engaged in the
development of natural resources. The salutary effect of a proper exercise of
this power would manifest itself along several lines. First, it would, to a limited
degree, ensure a gradual and more efficient development of national resources,
both natural and economic. Second, it would tend in the direction of an equalized
and more stable distribution of income. Finally, it would be operative as a factor
offsetting congestion of population in various centers." It is not to be assumed,
however, that such objectives are certain of attainment. They are set forth
merely for the purpose of indicating the lack of harmony between the present
stand of the Court on this problem and the current economic trend.
Fundamentally, the essential issue in this problem lies in a choice of the
proper body to exercise this power: the Commission or the individual railroads.
The most common criticism of action by the Commission is that the exercise
of this power is an usurpation of private rights which results in "government in
business". This, of course, is true, but it has been done before and from all
indications seems increasingly to be the trend of the future. , A second criticism
often voiced is that political administration of commercial problems is subject
to the abuses of "log-rolling" and other malpractices of politics. This is just
another way of saying that untoward motives may control the exercise of the
power. This criticism is equally applicable to the private administration of such
problems, and in fact more so, since in the latter case the only limiting factor is
'Compare the following statement with the result reached in Sprunt & Son v. United
States, supra note I i: "The law does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunities, or abili-
ties." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, at 46, 32 Sup. Ct. 22,
at 24 (gH).
' United States v. New River Co., supra note 39; Virginian Ry. v. United States, supra
note 41.
The continually changing nature of business conditions offers a serious obstacle to the
efficiency of an equalized rate structure. Thus, the competing localities may be satisfied for
the time being with existent rates, but if either of the localities obtains a commercial ad-
vantage sufficient to make itself felt in the market, a proper enforcement of the equalized
rate would require an immediate adjustment. This would result in a stifling of initiative in
business to a marked degree. Perhaps for this reason alone, such a scheme of things is not
practical when applied to conditions in the commercial world. The exploitation of natural
resources does not suffer from this characteristic to the same degree. Moreover, the advan-
tages of an economic development of natural resources more than compensates for the disad-
vantages of retarding initiative and competition.
"Among other advantages may be mentioned the following: the avoidance of port con-
gestion, and the promotion of market competition to the advantage of the consumer. See
Note (ig3i) 40 YAE L. J. 6oo, 603, and authorities there cited.
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the private incentive for profit. The uncontrolled exploitation of this incentive
has manifested itself in such a manner and with such results as to warrant the
trial of a new method-public regulation of nation-wide economic and com-
mercial problems.
L.W.C.
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE Am FOR THE MORTGAGE DEBToR-Forced sales
have reduced the market value of real estate to such an extent that the result
of foreclosure proceedings has been not only to deprive the mortgagor of his land,
but also, by reason of the virtual absence of competitive bidding at the sale, to
continue his liability for practically the whole of the mortgage indebtedness, in
the form of a deficiency judgment. The inequity of this situation is aggravated
by the fact that, at the time when the mortgage debt was created, the parties
contemplated that in the event of a foreclosure sale the proceeds would substan-
tially, at least, satisfy the indebtedness. In any event, the situation became so
acute as to give rise, in some parts of the country, to concerted, forcible resistance
to foreclosure sales. * Four distinct agencies have attempted to meet the problem
by providing some form of relief to the mortgage debtor. First, large private
creditors, particularly national banks and insurance companies, have refrained
from enforcing their rights of foreclosure in cases where the landowner was
in possession.' Second, gubernatorial pleas have been made, requesting mort-
gagees to desist from foreclosure.2  Third, legislatures have passed statutes
which, in one way or another, seek to enable the mortgagor to remain in posses-
sion and to alleviate the burden of inequitably heavy deficiency judgments.
Finally, some courts, without waiting for legislative sanction, have accomplished
the same purpose by judicial initiative, although other courts,3 deeming them-
selves unable to grant more substantial and direct relief, have resorted to dilatory
tactics in the effort to delay foreclosure. These legislative and judicial attempts
to afford substantial and direct relief present a problem as interesting in its legal
aspects as in its social and economic implications.
Judicial Aid
Originally, Chancery was liberal in coming to the aid of oppressed mortga-
gors. However, because of a respect for the rights of mortgagees and a dis-
inclination to be party to speculation on future property values, there developed
a reluctance on the part of the chancellor to intervene unless fraud, mistake,
or inequitable oppression were present.4  This reluctance crystallized into what
was traditionally considered a rule: Equity will not interpose in foreclosure pro-
'Rubright, Some Legal Aspects of the Farm Mortgage Foreclosure (1933) 5 RoCKY
MT. L. REv. 161, 166.
'Kentucky: U. S. Daily, Feb. 23, 1933, at 2213; Oklahoiut: U. S. Daily, Mar. I, 1933,
at 2245. See N. C. Laws 1933, Resolution No. 16. It is obvious however that such pleas
had no legal method of enforcement. Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 2, 1933, at I.
IN. Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1933, at 3; TI=E, Feb. 13, 1933, at 13. Ryan, Equity Power of
Courts in Foreclosure Cases (1933) I J. B. A. KAN. 301.
'(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 87; (1933) II N. C. L. Rv. 172; Anderson v. White,
2 App. D. C. 408 (1894) ; Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co., 138 Mo. 17, 39 S. W. 465
(1897) ; Miller v. Parker, 73 N. C. 58 (1875) ; Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 N. C. 789,
164 S. E. 335 (1932), (1933) I N. C. L. REv. 172, (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 87, (I933)
19 VA. L. REv. 42o; Floore v. Morgan, 175 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Common-
wealth Bank & Trust Co. v. MacDonell, 49 S. W. (2d) 525 (Ten. Civ. App. 1932) ; Muller
v. Bayly, 21 Gratt. 521 (Va. 1871) ; Muller's Adm'r v. Stone, 84 Va. 834, 6 S. E. 223 (1888) ;
Caperton v. Landcraft, 3 W. Va. 540 (1869) ; see Park v. Musgrave, 2 Thomp. & C. 571
(N. Y. 1874).
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ceedings, either before or after judicial sale, unless one or more of the three neces-
sary elements be proved. This tradition did not recognize financial stringency,
the undesirability of the time of year for a sale, or the fact that, because of de-
pressed economic conditions, the sale could be consummated only at an extreme
undervaluation, as reasons for enjoining foreclosure sales.5 Many of our courts
still feel the power of this rule.
In Bolich v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,0 the request for injunctive
relief from a foreclosure sale was predicated upon the ground that depressed
economic conditions would preclude the sale of the property at an intrinsically
fair valuation. Relief was refused; but the court implied that, under some rather
vaguely intimated circumstances, injunctive relief might be granted. The
"power" to enjoin a judicial sale because of economic conditions resulting in
financial hardship was affirmatively recognized by the chancery courts of New
Jersey in the cases of Fifth Ave. Bank of N. Y. v. Compson I and Kotler v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co." The prayer in both these cases was, however,
denied because of (i) the disproportionate interests of the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, and (2) a disinclination to anticipate an unconscionable sale price,
especially in view of that court's liberality to mortgagors who object to confirma-
tion of sale.5
Other courts have completely abandoned the traditional view and have
reverted to the original liberality. These courts have refused to permit the
mockery of a judicial sale under present conditions, and, for proper cause shown
in the individual case, have granted a foreclosure moratorium upon conditions
which would be equitable to the mortgagee. Thus, in First Union Savings Bank
v. Division State Bank,10 a lower Illinois court forbade a mortgagee to foreclose,
upon the condition that the mortgagor constitute himself a trustee in possession
for the mortgagee, with the duty of collecting rentals and applying them to taxes
and maintenance of the property as well as to the payment of interest upon the
principal indebtedness. Likewise, a lower New York court, characterizing its
own action as bold but human, ordered postponement of foreclosure proceedings
until the time of a reasonable assurance of normal competitive bidding.:1
Sharply contrasting with the liberal tenor of this latter opinion, however, is that
delivered by a justice of the same court who, in a similar case,'2 refused to delay
suit on a mortgage bond because to do so would, in his opinion, be a usurpation
of legislative powers as well as violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.
Examination of the authorities impresses one with the fact that delay of
foreclosure sales is not sought merely to halt evictions. The aim is rather to
'See authorities cited supra note 4; I HIGH, INJUC'rlONS (4th ed. 1905) § 454.
'Supra note 4.
113 N. J. Eq. 152, 166 Atl. 86 (0933).
8 168 AtI. 36 (N. J. Ch. 1933).
'See Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, i66 Atl.
538 (933) ; Baader v. Mascellino, 113 N. J. Eq. 189, 166 Atl. 466 ('933). ". . . certainly
the mere allegations of general depression before the property has been sold and an unconscion-
able purchase price established has not heretofore been deemed adequate to invoke equitable
power." Rogers, Depression as Warranting Restraint of Sale under Power in Mortgage or
Deed of Trst (933) 36 LAw NOTEs 73.
"0 Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, General No. B262438, April 1, 1933. See
Greenberg v. Zukan, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 15, 1933, at 529 (N. Y. 1933), where the court recog-
nized its power to restrain a sale, upon compelling reasons, and ordered a continuance of the
case pending an ascertainment of what the mortgagor would be willing to do in return for a
restraint of the sale.
See Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp., 147 Misc. 374, 383, 265 N. Y. Supp.
115, 124 (1933)-
'-'Loma Holding Co. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp., 147 Misc. 655, 265 N. Y. Supp. 125
(1933).
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postpone sale until more propitious times when it would be possible to secure
a price more in keeping with the property's intrinsic value, thus minimizing the
possibility of burdensome deficiency judgments. This problem has received
recognition by the courts. In title mortgage jurisdictions, the question of a
deficiency judgment rarely arose because the mortgage was a transfer of title
to the mortgagee, and, therefore, default by the mortgagor merely resulted in
loss of power to redeem. In rare cases, however, Equity realized that a great
depreciation in the intrinsic value of the security worked a severe hardship upon
the mortgagee who, accordingly, was permitted to secure a deficiency judgment
for the difference between the mortgage indebtedness and the property's fair
appraised value."3 Realization, however, that title mortgages, with attendant
strict foreclosure, often worked a hardship upon the mortgagor where the in-
trinsic value of the property exceeded the indebtedness, led to the adoption of
the lien mortgage and foreclosure by way of "foreclosure and sale". The pur-
pose of this was to permit the mortgagor to receive the fullest benefit of his
foreclosed property even to the extent of refunding any excess of the sale price
over the mortgage debt. Such sales were subject to court confirmation, 14 and at
one stage the courts refused confirmation and re-opened a sale if someone was
willing to bid ten per cent. more than the bid upon sale. This practice was con-
demned and discontinued, however, because it militated against the aims of a fore-
closure and sale by discouraging bidders in that they would be unsure of their
purchasers.", Therefore, in order to encourage bidding,1 6 it became the practice
to confirm all sales regardless of price, provided fraud, misconduct or surprise
were absent. This practice soon crystallized into a rule of law.'
7
After foreclosure, the judgment creditor is entitled to a deficiency judg-
ment for the difference between the judgment indebtedness and the sale price.'
In the absence of a free real estate market, rigid adherence to this rule not only
deprives the mortgagor of his land, but frequently leaves him still subject to
virtually the whole mortgage indebtedness in the form of a deficiency judgment.19
Many courts which gave lip service to this rule became extremely ingenious in
extracting from the facts some almost fictional irregularity upon which to base
a refusal of confirmation.2" Thus, the courts would recognize, -as an excuse to
refuse confirmation of a sale for an inadequate bid, the fact that a prospective
bidder had been delayed in reaching the sale,21 or that his attention at the sale
'Amory v. Fairbanks, 3 Mass. 562 (1793) ; Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346, 383 (N. Y.
1827) ; Dashwood v. Bithazey, Mosely 196 (Eng. 1729).
14 1 WITSIE, MORTGAGE FoRE0cSoURE (4th ed. 1927) § 729. See De Yampert v. Manley,
127 Ark. i53, 191 S. W. 905 (1917) ; State v. Holden, 96 Wash. 35, 164 Pac. 595 (917).
"For a review of this practice, criticism and prohibition, see Weiner, Conflicting Fuw-
tions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization (1927) 27 CoL. L. R.-v. 132.
10 See Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 205, 166
Atl. at 541.
' Continental Casualty Co. v. Brawner, 148 So. 809 (Ala. 1933) ; Kinnaird v. Farmers'
Bank, 6i S. W. (2d) 291 (Ky. 1933) ; Judah v. Pitts, 62 S. W. (2d) 715, 720 (Mo. 1933) ;
Roberson v. Matthews, 20o N. C. 241, i56 S. E. 496 (i93o) ; (1933) 8i U. OF PA. L. REv.
883; 3 JoNES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2140; I WILTsIE, op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 731, 752.
But see Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285, 27 Sup. Ct. 527 (907).
"33 JoNES, op. cit. supra note 17, at 719; 2 WnTsrE, op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 963, 973.
" See Baader v. Mascellino; Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, both
supra note 9.
'(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 87, 88; JONES, op. cit. supra note 17, §2108; Note (i92o)
8 A. L. R. iooi, ioo7; see Hinton v. Elliott, U. S. L. W., Oct. 17, 1933, at io4 (Ark. 1933) ;
Dewey v. Linscott, 20 Kan. 684 (1878) ; Demaray v. Little, i9 Mich. 244 (1869) ; Dawson v.
Drake, 29 N. J. Eq. 383 (1878) ; Rohrer v. Strickland, ii6 Va. 755, 82 S. E. 711 (1914).
m New Jersey National Bank v. Savemore Realty Corp., io7 N. J. Eq. 478, 153 Atl. Ago
0I931).
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had been temporarily distracted.2 In no case, however, was the sale set aside




A bold step in relief from exorbitant deficiency judgments was taken, in
the early months of 1933, by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the rather
publicized case of Suring State Bank v. Giese.24 The court recognized that de-
pressed economic conditions resulted in a virtual absence of bidders. The fact
that this resulted in an inadequate bid was considered sufficient cause for refusing
confirmation even though there was no showing that a re-sale would result in a
higher bid. In its effort to circumvent a statute providing for deficiency judg-
ments the court refused confirmation unless the judgment creditor would either
(i) credit the principal indebtedness with the "fair value" of the property as
determined upon appraisal, or (2) have a re-sale which would not be confirmed
unless the minimum or upset price set by the court were bid.2' The right to
refuse confirmation and order re-sale in such cases was recognized by the
Michigan court in Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody.28  That court, however, refused
to go as far as the Suring case by fixing an upset price, since it believed that
such procedure would contravene a statute permitting deficiency judgments, and
would penalize the mortgagee because of the depreciated value of the property.
This reasoning is not satisfying inasmuch as the court could continually refuse
confirmation until it believed a fair price had been bid.
An even bolder step was taken by a lower New York court 2 in vacating
a deficiency judgment because of the disparity between the sale price and the in-
trinsic value of the property. This courageous action was reversed by the Appel-
late Division in a memorandum which reiterated the traditional view, stating that
the order of the lower court had been "granted on an erroneous conception of
equitable principles and without any warrant or justification in law."
Perhaps the most ingenious yet satisfying rationale of a refusal to confirm
a sale for an inadequate price was developed by the New Jersey court in the
case of Federal Title & Mtge. Co. v. Lowenstein .2-  The court took the view
that, if there be an absence of competitive bidding, the reason for the practice
of confirming all sales where there has been no proof of fraud, oppression or
inequity no longer exists. It also was recognized that the creditor's purchase of
the property for the almost negligible costs which he had advanced was rather
analogous to a strict foreclosure, and therefore the mortgagee was ordered
Lefever v. Kline, 294 Pa. 22, 143 Atl. 488 (1928).
'Iona Bank v. Blair, 56 Kan. 430, 43 Pac. 686 (1896) ; Farmers' Bank v. Quick, 71"
Mich. 534, 39 N. W. 752 (1888) ; 3 JONES, 1oc. cit. supra note 17; Bothwell v. Godfrey, 168
Atl. 287 (N. J. Ch. 1933) semble.
Z- 2I0 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556, 85 A. L. R. 1477 (1933), (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 744,
(933) 27 I-. L. Rzv. 950, (933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 883, (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 961.
Among the recent cases which are contra are Continental Casualty Co. v. Brawner, Kinnaird
v. Farmers' Bank, both supra note 17; Southern Grocery Co. v. Merchants' & Planters' Title
& Investment Co., 186 Ark. 6,5, 54 S. W. (2d) 98o (1932).
' The court drew its analogy for the setting of an upset price from cases involving cor-
porate foreclosures where that mechanism had been adopted for the protection of the mort-
gagees and because the size of the corporate property limited the number of prospective pur-
chasers. Weiner, supra note 25, at 136. Neither of these factors is present in the Suring
case, and it was accordingly criticized in (1933) 42 YALE L. 3. 96o, 962.
:249 N. W. 844 (Mich. 1933).
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Johar Realty Corp., where Mr. Justice Schmuck vacated a
deficiency judgment. N. Y. Sup. Ct., Special Term, July 7, 1933. This order was reversed
by the Appellate Division, Nov. 3, 1933.
' Supra note 9. Accord: Fidelity Realty Co. v. Fidelity Corp., 166 Atl. 727 (N. 3. CH.
1933) ; Lurie v. Hockenjos Co., 167 At. 766 (N. 3. Ch. 1933) seinbte; cf. United B. & L. v.
Newman, 166 Atl. 537 (N. J. Ch. 1933), where the court refused to set an upset price in ad-
vance of sale.
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to credit the mortgage indebtedness with the fair value of the property before
suing for a deficiency judgment. Thus, the practice of taking into account the
fair value of the property--originally invoked for the benefit of mortgage-
creditors who desired relief from the hardship of depreciation of the in-
trinsic value of their security 20_-has been turned to the advantage of mortgage-
debtors who are threatened with deficiency judgments because of depreciation
in market value.
These cases indicate that courts which will grant relief to the mortgage-
debtor are disposed to set aside a completed sale rather than enjoin a future sale,
probably because the former course is less in conflict with authority. It is
doubtful whether this deference to precedent is justifiable in view of the admitted
existence of an emergency. 0 Courts should be willing to employ to the utmost
Equity's traditional power to adapt its procedure and relief to meet the exigen-
cies of the case. 31 However, they should not completely lose sight of the inter-
ests of the mortgagee. They should be reasonably certain that the relief
granted the mortgagor creates and preserves a nice balance of the equities of
both parties under the existing circumstances.
32
Legislative Aid
Some authorities, believing the courts powerless to aid land-poor debtors
because of crystallization of the law with respect to creditors' rights, have
suggested that the matter is one for legislative action.33 Within the past year
many legislatures have attempted to grant relief to mortgage-debtors by way
of stay of foreclosure sales,34 extension of the period of redemption there-
from 35 and release from deficiency judgments. 0 The fact that virtually all this
' See Baader v. Mascellino, supra note 9, where the court refused aid to mortgage cred-
itor who had secured a deficiency judgment in setting aside a fraudulent conveyance unless
the judgment creditor would "do equity" by crediting the judgment with the fair value of the
property foreclosed. See also supra note 13.
' Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals flayed
Equity's tendency to rigidity saying: "Equity follows the law, but not slavishly or always."
Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N. Y. 1, 9, 171 N. E. 884, 888 (193o). It has been sug-
gested that Equity's power to relieve present conditions should be concurrent with that of the
legislature. (1933) 21 CAIF. L. Ray. 522, 523. Also that Equity can act better than the
legislature because there is less likelihood of its act being held unconstitutional. Carey,
Brabner-Smith, Sullivan, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures: IV. Reorganization
(1933) 97 11- L. Rav. 849.
' In speaking of judicial intervention in the economic chaos precipitated by the World
War, it was said by one of the leading European jurists that in the absence of emergency
legislation the courts had to create new legal norms and "render their decisions with more
fidelity to economic facts, with more general utility, with greater justice than would have
been possible through statutes conceived in the past upon the basis of totally different postu-
lates and world conditions." Sperl, Case Law and the European Codified Law (1925) 19
hu. L. REv. 505, 517.
n See First Union Trust & Savings Bank v. Division State Bank, supra note 10.
nLoma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp., supra note 12, at 659, 265 N. Y.
Supp. at 130; (1933) 42 YAIE L. J. 1236, 1238.
14 Ariz. Laws 1933, no. 2I; Ark. Acts 1933, no. 21; Iowa Acts 1933, c. 182; Minn. Laws
1933, c. 44; Mont. Laws 1933, c. 116; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 65; N. H. Laws 1933, c. i61 §§ 3-8;
N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 793; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 99; Onio CODE (Baldwin, 1933) § 11588; Okla.
Laws 1933, c. 16; Pa. Laws 1933, nos. 34, 137; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 17, 1O2; Vt. Laws 1933,
no. 30, § 2; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 15.
=Ark. Acts 1933, no. 57; Iowa Acts 1933, c. 179; Kan. Laws 1933, c. 232; Mont. Laws
1933, c. 15o; N. H. Laws 1933, c. 161, § 9; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 155, 157; S. D. Laws 1933,
c. 137; Vt. Laws 1933, no. 30, § 3; Wis. Laws 1933, c. II.
SGArk. Acts 1933, no. 21; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, Supp. 1933) §§ 580 (a),
580 (b) ; Idaho Laws 1933, c. i5o; Kan. Laws 1933, C. 218; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 247, 339;
Neb. Laws 1933, c. 41, 45; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 794; N. C. Laws 1933, c. 35, 275, 529; N. D.
Laws 1933, c. 155; S. C. Acts 1933, c. 264, 366; S. D. Laws 1933, c. 138; Tex. Laws 1933,
c. 92; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 13.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
legislation was designed to meet a present condition, arising from a pre-existent
relationship, raises constitutional questions.
The "impairment of obligations" clause was inserted in the Federal Con-
stitution as a direct result of agitation for moratoria and other forms of debtors'
relief.3 7  This clause, together with the "due process" clause, requires that
legislatures be cautious when seeking to remedy a social ill arising from a pre-
existing relationship. Moratoria vested with the guise of public benefit, as in
the case of laws which staved action for a definite time against persons in war
service, have been held to be proper.38 On the other hand general moratory
statutes, as respects pre-existing contracts, have generally been held unconstitu-
tional because designed solely for the benefit of the debtor class.30 Courts, apply-
ing similar reasoning, have generally held invalid those statutes purporting to
extend the period of redemption from past sales,40 as well as statutes providing
for the refusal to confirm judicial sales unless a certain proportion of the
appraised value had been bid.41 It is significant, however, that those statutes
did not recite their need in view of a public emergency.
In dealing with these problems the courts have often attempted to differen-
tiate between laws affecting only the remedy and laws operating upon substantive
rights. This differentiation becomes tenuous when one realizes that that which
affects the remedy must, at least indirectly, affect the right.4 ' The question
which the court should consider is not whether the laws deal with right or
remedy, but whether they are reasonable regulations for the betterment of the
public health, safety or morals, i. e., within the "police power".
The legislatures, with this in mind, have included in their emergency mort-
gage relief statutes recitals that the statutes are necessary to the preservation of
public peace, health and morals, because the hardships attendant upon strict
compliance wtih foreclosure procedure in times of emergency (extreme economic
depression) have fostered almost open rebellion. These statutes are designed
towards either or both of two ends: (i) relieving the mortgagor from the bur-
dens of inequitably large deficiency judgments; (2) permitting the mortgagor
to remain in possession either by staying the sale or by extending the period
of redemption therefrom, until more propitious times.
The stay laws take a variety of forms ranging from a blanket moratorium
for a definite period upon all foreclosures, to authorization of a judicial stay
upon equitable terms and conditions. Minnesota and Texas postponed all sales
for a ninety-day period. Although the Minnesota act was upheld as being
a mere postponement of the remedy which was reasonable in view of financial
stress,43 the Texas statute was held to be unconstitutional. 44 The Texas court
'See Feller, M1oratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HA v. L. REv.
io6o, io62, io67.
' McCormick v. Rusch, i5 Iowa 128 (1863) ; Pierrard v. Hoch, 97 Ore. 71, 184 Pac. 494
(i919) ; Breitenback v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313 (3863). Where the moratorium was not for a
definite time the act was held to be unconstitutional. Clark v. Martin, 3 Grant 393 (Pa.
1863) ; Hasbrouck v. Shipman, 16 Wis. 297 (3862).
'Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389 (1867) ; Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N. C. 366 (186i) ; Bunn
v. Gorgas, 41 Pa. 44i (1862).
" People ex rel. Thorne v. Hays, 4 Cal. 127 (3854) ; Bronson v. Kinzie, 3 How. 311 (U.
S. 843) ; cf. Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298 (i86o).
'McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 6o8 (U. S. 1844); Robards v. Brown, 40 Ark. 423
(883).
Any change in remedy which does not affect the obligations of the party can hardly be
said to give the relief sought. See (i933) 42 YAiE L. J. 1236, 1240.
' Minnesota ex rel. Lichscheidl v. Moeller, 249 N. W. 330 (Minn. 1933) (Minn. Laws
1933, c. 44).
"Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 62 S. W. (2d) 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (Tex. Laws 1933,
c. io2). The Idaho statute permitting the Governor to suspend foreclosure proceedings was
held unconstitutional as to pre-existing mortgage contracts. Alliance Trust Co. v. Hall, U.
S. L. W., Dec. i9, 1933, at 305 (Idaho, 1933) (Idaho Laws 1933, c. 124).
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refused to recognize the statute as a valid exercise of the "police power",
since it considered that it was designed more for the aid of a debtor class than
for the general public good. Arkansas and Oklahoma, in an endeavor to give
their moratoria the semblance of mere procedural change, provided that the
return days of writs in foreclosure proceedings should be three months and
nine months respectively.4 5 The Oklahoma court in holding its statute in-
valid 411 intimated that if the mortgagee had been compensated for the delay,
another result might have been reached.47 The Oklahoma court accordingly
sustained that part of the statute which permitted the court to order a continu-
ance upon the mortgagor's payment of a fair rent.
The Minnesota court, in Blaisdell v. Homie B. & L. _Ass'n,48 upheld the
Minnesota statute, which permitted the court at its discretion to extend the
period of redemption upon the mortgagor's payment of a fair rental. The court
admitted that the enactment impaired, to some extent, the obligation of contracts.
It held, however, that in view of the present emergency, and inasmuch as the
mortgagee was being compensated for delay, such action was a reasonable exer-
cise of the "police power". It was upon this one fact of compensation that
the court distinguished the case before it from State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein49
in which the North Dakota statute had been denounced as unconstitutional.
The Nebraska court, however, in Schultz v. Stephens,50 moved by the hardship
upon the small mortgagee, invalidated the Nebraska statute even though it pro-
vided for the payment of a fair rent during the period of continuance. A recent
Texas case,5 placing emphasis upon the lack of assurance of the mortgagee's
proper compensation, held unconstitutional an enactment providing for a con-
tinuance and the appointment of a receiver during such period. On the other
hand, the New York statute,52 providing for a stay in all proceedings to enforce
payment of an obligation arising out of or incidental to a mortgage because of
default in the principal indebtedness, was upheld by the Appellate Division of that
state in McCarty v. Prudence Bonds Corporation,"3 even though the only pro-
vision for the mortgagee's compensation was in the event that the income from
the property exceeded the carrying charges.
Similar problems have been encountered and solutions attempted by the
various deficiency relief statutes. North Carolina and South Dakota, realizing
the grave injustice of excessive deficiency judgments, abolished them as to future
mortgages given to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price of realty.
5 4
'Ark. Laws 1933, no. 21; Okla. Laws, 1933, c. 16.
"' Oklahoma ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield, U. S. L. W., Oct. 24, 1933, at 120 (Okla. 1933).
1 Ibid.
' 249 N. W. 334 (Minn. 1933) (Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339). Similar statutes permitting
conditional extension of period of redemption are: Iowa Acts 1933, c. 179; N. H. Laws 1933,
c. 161; S. D. Laws 1933, c. 137; Wis. Laws 1933, c. I. Statutes permitting conditional stay
or continuance of foreclosure proceedings are: Ariz. H. B. (1933), no. 167; Iowa Acts 1933,
c. 182; Mont. Laws 1933, c. r16; Neb. Laws 1933, c. 65; OHIO CoDE (Baldwin, 1933) § 11588;
Okla. Laws 1933, c. 16; Pa. Laws 1933, no. 137; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 102; Vt. Laws 1933,
no. 30.
4249 N. W. 11S (N. D. 1933) (N. D. Laws 1933, c. 157-extending period of redemp-
tion). Kan. Laws 1933, c. 232, which also extended period of redemption without providing
.for compensation, was declared unconstitutional in Lingerfelt v. Heironimus, reported in
(1933) I J. B. A. KAN. 3o6. See N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 793.
"0 Case No. 9484, Dist. Ct. Hebron County, Neb. 1933 (Neb. Laws 1933, c. 65).
"Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W. (2d) 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ; Mountain Townsite
Co. v. Cooper, 63 S. W. (2d) 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
w N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 793. This act does not stay foreclosure suits started for any de-
fault other than that in the principal obligation. See Clark, The New Moratorium Legisla-
tion (1933) 5 N. Y. S. B. A. BULL. 408.
149 Misc. 13, 266 N. Y. Supp. 629 (933).
N. C. Laws 1933, c. 36; S. D. Laws 1933, c. 138.
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If present relief is to be given, however, the legislation must act upon existing
mortgages. Nebraska sought to do this by depriving its courts of jurisdiction
to grant further deficiency judgments.55 An indirect attempt to achieve this
same result was made by the Arkansas legislature, which provided that the
plaintiff in foreclosure proceedings must stipulate his willingness to bid the
amount of the judgment plus costs. This statute was held unconstitutional in
Adams v. Spillyards 56 on the ground that to do away with deficiency judgments
which were permitted by the law in existence at the time of contracting, would
be violative of constitutional injunctions. Arkansas, Kansas, Minnesota and
Nebraska also provided that confirmation of sale should be refused and a re-sale
ordered if the property did not sell for its "fair intrinsic value". 57  Such statutes
have, however, been held unconstitutional as to existing mortgages.58 To obviate
this difficulty, the Kansas statute, which permitted the equity court to follow the
procedure of the Suring case, recites that it is declaratory of the always existent
powers of Kansas equity courts.55 This would seem to preclude a contention
that the enactment impairs the obligation of contracts.
Several of the statutes provide that, regardless of the price secured at
sale, a deficiency judgment should be entered only for the difference between
"fair value" and the sum of the foreclosure judgment plus costs.6" New Jersey,
in Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co.,6 has declared such a statute unconstitu-
tional. It is regrettable that the benefits of the statute, in that case, were invoked
by a mortgagor who had purchased his own $9o,ooo property for $ioo at the
sale. In such a case it is evident that the application of the statute would have
resulted directly in a scaling down of the mortgage debt. To avoid such injustice
to the mortgagee, and to designate the true purpose of such statutes, North
Carolina has provided that the benefits of such a determination of the deficiency
shall be available only where the mortgagee is the purchaser at foreclosure sale. "
In dealing with the constitutionality of these various statutes, argument
has centered upon the possible analogy of the "Emergency Rent Cases".63 These
cases held constitutional legislative enactments, which, during a two year emer-
gency period, permitted tenants to remain in possession after the terms upon
payment of a fair rental. The cases which uphold the present emergency mort-
gage relief legislation do so upon the strength of a statement of Mr. Justice
Holmes in one of the "Emergency Rent Cases". "A limit in time. to tide over a
passing trouble, well might justify a law that could not be upheld as a perma-
nent change." 64 On the other hand, courts which do not feel justified in uphold-
ing the emergency mortgage legislation find a factual distinction between the
mortgage relief statutes and the statutes involved in the "Emergency Rent Cases"
and quote the dictuh of Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Neb. Laws 1933, c. 41; N. D. Laws 1933, c. 155.
'61 S. W. (2d) 686 (Ark. 1933) (Ark. Acts 1933, no. 57).
' Ark. Acts 1933, no. 21; Kan. Laws 1933, c. 218; Minn. Laws 1933, c. 339; Neb. Laws
1933, c. 45.
' See Robards v. Brown; McCracken v. Hayward, both supra note 41.
"Kan. Laws 1933, c. 218.
' CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, Supp. 1933) §§ 58o (a), 580 (b) ; Idaho Laws 1933,
c. 150; Kan. Laws 1933, c. 218; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 794; N. C. Laws 1933, c. 275; S. C. Acts
1933, no. 264; Tex. Laws 1933, c. 92.
Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., U. S. L. W., Dec. 12, 1933, at 281 (N. J. 1933).
N. C. Laws 1933, c. 275.
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (192o); Marcus Brown Co. v. Feld-
man, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (i92i); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42
Sup. Ct. 289 (1922) ; People ex rel. Durham v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 13o N. E. 6oi
(1921).'Block v. H-irsh, supra note 63, at 157, 41 Sul). Ct. at 46o.
NOTES
Mahon,)" in which he declared that the Rent Cases "went to the verge of the
law" and that "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."
Conclusion
That some form of relief for the overburdened mortgage-debtor is neces-
sary, cannot be doubted in view of the emergency which exists. It is obvious
that bickerings as to whether relief should be solely for the legislature, or for
the courts as well, are of minor import if the power of either to grant it be
admitted. A few courts, without the aid of legislation, have rediscovered the
original power of Chancery to impose equitable conditions upon the mortgagee's
right to foreclose. Certainly, a statute which does no more than this not only
court be upheld because it is within the "police power", but should be upheld
since it is merely declaratory of a power which has always resided in the courts
of equity.08 The latter ground is especially convenient in meeting the contention
that the statute in question, as to existing mortgages, impairs the obligation of
contracts.
S.S.S.
'26o U. S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158 (1922). See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121 (1866).
"No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of its [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government."
' But see Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., supra note 61, where this contention was
expressly rejected.
